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Abstract. We introduce a new class of games, called social contribution games
(SCGs), where each player’s individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on
society because of his presence. Our results reveal that SCGs constitute useful
abstractions of altruistic games when it comes to the analysis of the robust price
of anarchy. We first show that SCGs are altruism-independently smooth, i.e., the
robust price of anarchy of these games remains the same under arbitrary altruistic
extensions. We then devise a general reduction technique that enables us to re-
duce the problem of establishing smoothness for an altruistic extension of a base
game to a corresponding SCG. Our reduction applies whenever the base game re-
lates to a canonical SCG by satisfying a simple social contribution boundedness
property. As it turns out, several well-known games satisfy this property and are
thus amenable to our reduction technique. Examples include min-sum scheduling
games, congestion games, second price auctions and valid utility games. Using
our technique, we derive mostly tight bounds on the robust price of anarchy of
their altruistic extensions. For the majority of the mentioned game classes, the
results extend to the more differentiated friendship setting. As we show, our re-
duction technique covers this model if the base game satisfies three additional
natural properties.
1 Introduction
Motivation and Background. The study of the inefficiency of equilibria in strategic
games has been one of main research streams in algorithmic game theory in the last
decade and contributed to the explanation of several phenomena observed in real life.
More recently, researchers have also started to incorporate more complex social rela-
tionships among the players in such studies, accounting for the fact that players cannot
always be regarded as isolated entities that merely act on their own behalf (see also
[12]). In particular, the extent by which other-regarding preferences such as altruism
and spite impact the inefficiency of equilibria has been studied intensively; see, e.g.,
[3,4,5,6,7,11,14,15,16,19].
In this context, some counterintuitive results have been shown that are still not well-
understood. For example, in a series of papers [4,5,7] it was observed that for congestion
games the inefficiency of equilibria gets worse as players become more altruistically,
therefore suggesting that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society. On the
other hand, valid utility games turn out to be unaffected by altruism as their inefficiency
remains unaltered under altruistic behavior [7]. These discrepancies triggered our inter-
est in the research conducted in this paper. The basic question that we are asking here
is: What is it that impacts the inefficiency of equilibria of games with altruistic players?
To this aim, we consider two different models that have previously been studied in
the literature: the altruism model [7] and the friendship model [19]. In both models,
one starts from a strategic game (called the base game) specifying the direct cost of
each player and then extends this game by defining the perceived cost of each player
as a function of his neighbors’ direct costs. In the altruism model, player i’s perceived
cost is a convex combination of his direct cost and the overall social cost. In the more
general friendship model, player i’s perceived cost is a linear combination of his direct
cost and his friends’ costs.
In order to quantify the inefficiency of equilibria in our games we resort to the con-
cept of the price of anarchy (PoA) [20], which is defined as the worst-case relative gap
between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum (over all instances of
the game). By now, a standard approach to prove upper bounds on the price of anar-
chy is through the use of the smoothness framework introduced by Roughgarden [21].
Basically, this framework allows us to derive bounds on the robust price of anarchy
by showing that the underlying game satisfies a certain (λ, µ)-smoothness property
for some parameters λ and µ. The robust price of anarchy holds for various solution
concepts, ranging from pure Nash equilibria to coarse correlated equilibria (see, e.g.,
Young [27]).
The original smoothness framework [21] has been extended to both the altruism and
the friendship model in [7] and [19], respectively. Applying these adapted smoothness
frameworks to bound the robust price of anarchy is often technically involved because
of the altruistic terms that need to be taken into account additionally (see also the analy-
ses in [7,19]).
Instead, we take a different approach here. As we will show, there is a natural class
of games, which we term social contribution games (SCGs), that is intimately connected
with our altruism and friendship games. We establish a general reduction technique
that enables us to reduce the problem of establishing smoothness for our altruism or
friendship game to the problem of proving smoothness for a corresponding SCG. The
latter is usually much simpler than proving smoothness for the altruism or friendship
game directly. This also opens up the possibility to derive better bounds on the robust
price of anarchy of these games through the usage of our new reduction technique.
Our Contributions. The main contributions presented in this paper are as follows:
– We introduce a new class of games, which we term social contribution games
(SCGs), where each player’s individual cost is defined as the cost he incurs on
society because of his presence. Said differently, player i’s cost is equal to the dif-
ference in social cost if player i is present/absent in the game. We show that SCGs
are altruism-independently smooth, i.e., if the SCG is (λ, µ)-smooth then every
altruistic extension is (λ, µ)-smooth as well.
– We derive a general reduction technique to bound the robust price of anarchy of
both altruism and friendship games. Basically, the reduction can be applied when-
ever the underlying base game is social contribution bounded, meaning that the
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Table 1. Robust price of anarchy bounds derived in this paper for the friendship model (unless
specified otherwise). (∗) Our result only holds if a certain weight condition is satisfied. The
previous best result was shown only for the special case R||∑
j
Cj .
Robust PoA Remarks
Games our results previous best
R||
∑
j
wjCj (∗) = 4 ≤ 23.31 [19] RPoA = 4 (selfish players) [10]
P ||
∑
j Cj ≤ 2 RPoA =
3
2
− 1
2m
(selfish players)
linear congestion games = 17
3
≤ 7 [19] 5 ≤ PoA ≤ 17
3
(in special case) [1]
second price auctions = 2
valid utility games = 2 = 2 [7] altruism model; RPoA = 2 (selfish
players) [21]
direct cost of each player is bounded by his respective cost in the corresponding
SCG (for the friendship model a slightly stronger condition needs to hold). It is
worth mentioning that this reduction preserves the (λ, µ)-smoothness parameters,
i.e., the altruism or friendship game inherits the (λ, µ)-smoothness parameters of
the SCG.
– We generalize smoothness for friendship extensions to weight-bounded social cost
functions. In previous papers, the used techniques usually required sum-bounded-
ness, which is a stronger condition [19]. Applying this definition to scheduling
games with weighted sum as social cost, we derive a nice characterization of those
scheduling games whose robust PoA does not grow for friendship extensions.
– We show that social contribution boundedness is satisfied by several well-known
games, like min-sum scheduling games, congestion games, second-price auctions
and valid utility games. Using our reduction technique, we then derive upper bounds
on the robust price of anarchy of their friendship/altruism extensions. In most cases
we prove matching lower bounds. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Related Work.
Several articles propose models of altruism and spite [1,3,4,5,6,7,11,14,15,16]. Among
these articles, the inefficiency of equilibria in the presence of altruism and spite was
studied for various games in [1,4,5,6,7,11]. After its introduction in [21], the smooth-
ness framework has been extended to incomplete information settings [22,24,25] and
altruism/spite settings [7,19].
The robust price of anarchy for minsum scheduling (not taking altruism or friend-
ship into account) was studied in various papers such as [17]. They show that it does
not exceed 2 for Q||
∑
j Cj (which we improve to a tight value of 3/2 in the special
case P ||
∑
j Cj). A value of 4 for R||
∑
j wjCj has been proven in [9].
Our work on linear congestion games generalizes a result in [1]. They show that
the pure price of anarchy does not exceed 17/3 in a restricted friendship setting (αij ∈
{0, 1}).
As indicated above, most related to our work are the articles [7,19]. We significantly
improve the bounds on the robust price of anarchy for congestion games and unrelated
3
machine scheduling games in [19] and at the same time simplify the analysis by using
our reduction technique.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Ci}i∈N ) be a cost-minimization game, where N is the set of
players, Σi is player i’s strategy space, Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi is the set of strategy profiles,
and Ci : Σ → R denotes the cost player i must pay for a given strategy profile. We
assume that each player seeks to minimize his cost. A social cost function C : Σ → R
assigns a social cost to each strategy profile. We usually require C to be sum-bounded,
i.e., C(s) ≤
∑
i∈N Ci(s) for all s ∈ Σ.
We denote payoff-maximization games asG = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Πi}i∈N ) with social
welfare Π : Σ → R. In this case, each player i tries to maximize his utility (or payoff)
Πi. Again, we usually assume that Π is sum-bounded, i.e. Π(s) ≥
∑
i∈N Πi(s) for all
s ∈ Σ.
In the following, we state most of the definitions and theorems only for cost-
minimization games. The payoff-maximization case works similarly by reversing all
inequalities.
Definition 1. A coarse equilibrium of a cost-minimization game G is a probability
distribution σ over Σ such that the following holds: If s is a random variable with
distribution σ, then for all players i and all strategies s∗i ∈ Σi, Es∼σ[Ci(s)] ≤
Es−i∼σ−i [Ci(s
∗
i , s−i)], where σ−i is the projection of σ on Σ−i = Σ1 × . . .×Σi−1×
Σi+1×. . .×Σn. A mixed Nash equilibrium is a coarse equilibrium σ that is the product
of independent probability distributions σi on Σi (for i ∈ N ). A (pure) Nash equilib-
rium is a strategy profile s ∈ Σ such that for all s∗ ∈ Σ, Ci(s) ≤ Ci(s∗i , s−i), where
s−i denotes the restriction of s to Σ−i.
The coarse (resp. correlated, mixed, pure) price of anarchy (PoA) of a cost-mini-
mization game G is defined as sups C(s)/C(s∗), where s∗ minimizes C and s runs
over the coarse (resp. correlated, mixed, pure) Nash equilibria of G.3 The coarse (resp.
correlated, mixed, pure) PoA of a class G of games is defined as the supremum of the
respective PoA values of games in G.
Note that pure Nash equilibria constitute a subset of mixed Nash equilibria which
constitute a subset of coarse equilibria. This implies that that the respective prices of
anarchy are non-decreasing (in this order).
2.1 The Altruism Model
Definition 2 ([7]). Let α ∈ [0, 1]N and G be a cost-minimization game. The
α-altruistic extension of G is defined as the cost-minimization game Gα =
(N, {Σi}i∈N , {Cαi }i∈N ), where for any i ∈ N , the perceived cost is the convex com-
bination Cαi = (1−αi)Ci +αiC (interpreting RΣ as a real vector space). G is called
the base game. The social cost function ofGα is againC, i.e., the cost of the base game.
3 Similarly, we define the respective types of PoA for a payoff-maximization game as
supΠ(s∗)/Π(s), where s and s∗ are as above.
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The higher the ‘altruism level’ αi is, the more i cares about the society in general:
player i behaves egoistically if αi = 0, whereas he is completely altruistic if αi = 1.
Definition 3. Let G be a cost-minimization game with sumbounded social cost and
consider an altruistic extension Gα of G. Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth if there exists an optimal
strategy s∗ such that for any strategy s ∈ Σ,∑
i∈N
(
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s))
)
≤ λC(s∗) + µC(s),
where we abbreviate C−i := C − Ci.
The robust PoA of Gα is defined as inf{ λ1−µ |Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth, µ < 1}.
Theorem 1 ([7]). Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of G. Then the coarse (and thus
the correlated, mixed and pure) PoA of Gα is bounded from above by the robust PoA of
Gα.
2.2 The Friendship Model
Definition 4 ([19]). Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Ci}i∈N ) be a cost-minimization game
with social cost C and α ∈ [0, 1]N×N such that αii = 1 for all i ∈ N . The α-friendship
extension of G is defined as Gα = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Cαi }i∈N ), where for any i ∈ N , the
perceived cost is defined as Cαi =
∑
j αijCj . Like in the altruism model, we consider
C, the social cost function of the base game, as the social cost for Gα.
For players i and j, αij can be interpreted as the level of affection i feels towards
j. Note that if C =
∑
j Cj , then the altruism model is a special case of the friendship
model because in this case, Cαi = Ci +
∑
j 6=i αiCj .
Next we adapt the smoothness definition in [19] for the friendship model to the
weighted player case; we will later need this to bound the robust PoA for weighted
completion time scheduling games.
Definition 5. Let Gα be friendship extension of a cost-minimization game with a
weight-bounded social cost function, i.e., C ≤ ∑iwiCi for some w ∈ RN+ . Gα is
(λ, µ)-smooth if there exists a (possibly randomized) strategy profile s¯ such that for all
strategy profiles s and all optima s∗,∑
i
wi
(
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(s))
)
≤ λC(s∗) + µC(s).
We define the robust PoA of Gα as inf{ λ1−µ |Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth, µ < 1}
Theorem 2. LetGα be a friendship extension of a cost-minimization game with weight-
bounded social cost functionC. If Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth with µ < 1, then the coarse PoA
of Gα is at most λ1−µ .
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
One can also generalize the smoothness definition of the altruism model to weighted
social costs and by allowing arbitrary s¯ instead of the optimal s∗ in the term that is to
be bounded. However, we do not need such generality in this paper and thus leave it out
for simplicity.
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3 Social Contribution Games
Definition 6. Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Ci}i∈N ) be a cost-minimization game with so-
cial cost C : Σ → R. We call G a (cost-minimization) social contribution game (SCG)
if for all players i there exists a default strategy ∅i such that for all s ∈ Σ,
Ci(s) = C(s)− C(∅i, s−i).
The strategy ∅i is often interpreted as ‘refusing to participate in the game’. In that
sense, i pays exactly the social cost he causes by choosing to play; in the payoff-
maximization case, he gets exactly what he contributes to the social welfare. So social
contribution games are ‘fair’ in some sense.
Basic utility games [26] satisfy the definition of an SCG (see also Section 7). In
particular, the competitive facility location game (which is a basic utility game by [26])
is an SCG.
We now show that social contribution games satisfy a nice invariance property with
respect to their α-altruistic extensions.
Lemma 1. Any social contribution game is altruism-independently smooth, i.e., for all
α = (αi)i∈N and corresponding altruistic extensions Gα of G, the robust price of
anarchy in G and Gα is the same.
Proof. For all players i, C−i(s) = C(s) − Ci(s) is independent of si since C(s) −
Ci(s) = C(∅i, s−i). Thus for all strategy profiles s, s∗, and all α ∈ RN ,∑
i
(
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s))
)
=
∑
i
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i).
It follows that for all (λ, µ) ∈ R2, Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth iff G is. ⊓⊔
The notions of α-altruistic extensions and α-independent smoothness can be easily
extended to α ∈ RN . The above lemma continues to hold in this case. So even if a
player wants to hurt society, the robust PoA stays the same.
3.1 Social Contribution Bounded Games
Definition 7. Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Ci}i∈N ) a cost-minimization game with sum-
bounded social cost C : Σ → R. We call G social contribution bounded (SC-bounded)
if for all players i there exists a default strategy ∅i such that for all s ∈ Σ,
Ci(s) ≤ C(s)− C(∅i, s−i).
In this case, we define the corresponding social contribution game G¯ =
(N, {Σi}i∈N , {C¯i}i∈N ) by setting C¯i(s) = C(s)− C(∅i, s−i).
Again, we think of ∅i as the option that i does not participate. Note that ∅i need not
actually be an element of Σi. In many games such as scheduling or congestion games,
it is not an option not to participate (i.e., not to use any resources). So formally, we
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should require: There exists a function C :
∏
i∈N (Σi ∪ {∅i}) → R such that C|Σ = C
and Ci(s) ≤ C(s)−C(∅i, s−i) for all i and s. However, there is a natural way to extend
C (and Ci) on
∏
i∈N (Σi ∪ {∅i}), as we will see later. So for simplicity of notation, we
write C instead of C.
The following theorem shows that if we want to get a bound on the PoA of α-
altruistic extensions of an SC-bounded game, we might as well consider the corre-
sponding SCG regardless of α.
Theorem 3. Let G be social contribution bounded and suppose that the robust price of
anarchy of the corresponding SCG G¯ is ξ. Then for all altruistic extensions Gα of G,
the robust price of anarchy is at most ξ.
Proof. Let s, s∗ ∈ Σ. We know that for αi ∈ [0, 1]N ,
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s))
= (1 − αi)Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s))
≤ (1 − αi)(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− C(∅i, s−i)) + αi(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− C(∅i, s−i))
= C¯i(s
∗
i , s−i),
where the inequality follows from applying SC-boundedness twice. Summing over all
players i, it follows that Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth if G¯ is. ⊓⊔
Now, in order to be able to make statements about friendship extensions, we need a
slightly stronger definition.
Definition 8. Assume a cost minimization game G with weight-bounded social cost
satisfies three assumptions for all s ∈ Σ and players i:
1. Ci(∅i, s−i) = 0 (if i does not participate, he pays nothing)
2. ∀j 6= i : Cj(∅i, s−i) ≤ Cj(s) (other players’ costs can only increase if i partici-
pates)
3. wi
∑
j(Cj(s) − Cj(∅i, s−i)) ≤ C(s) − C(∅i, s−i) (the weighted impact of i’s
participation on the players’ costs is bounded by his impact on the social cost)
Then we call G strongly SC-bounded.
If all weights are 1, then assumption (3) easily follows from
3b. C(s) =
∑
j Cj(s) (social cost is sum of individual costs).
Using this definition, we are able to derive bounds on friendship extensions:
Theorem 4. Let G be strongly SC-bounded. Suppose the robust price of anarchy of G¯
is ξ. Then for all friendship extensions Gα, the robust price of anarchy is at most ξ.
Proof. Consider the friendship extension Gα of G, where Cαi =
∑
j αijCj , αij ∈
[0, 1], αii = 1. We calculate that for all i:
wi
(
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(s))
)
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(2)
≤ wi
(
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(∅i, s−i))
)
(2)
≤ wi
(
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(∅i, s−i))
)
(1)
= wi
∑
j
(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(∅i, s−i))
(3)
≤ C(s¯i, s−i)− C(∅i, s−i) = C¯i(s¯i, s−i).
Summing over all i, it follows that if G¯ is (λ, µ)-smooth4, then so is Gα. ⊓⊔
If all weights are 1, then SC-boundedness follows from strong SC-boundedness. To
see this, consider the case where α = 0 and carry out the proof of Theorem 4 for s
instead of (s¯i, s−i).
4 Minsum Machine Scheduling
A scheduling game G = (m,n, (pij)i∈M,j∈N , (wj)j∈N ) consists of a set of jobs (play-
ers) [n] = {1, . . . , n} and a set of machines [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. For each machine i and
job j, pij ∈ R+ denotes the processing time of j on i. Furthermore, wj is the weight
of job j. The strategy space Σi of a job j is simply the set of machines. By ∅i = ∅ we
mean the strategy where i uses no machine.
Let x be a strategy profile. For a machine i, we denote by Xi the set of jobs that are
scheduled on i. Furthermore, xj denotes the machine j is assigned to. Following the
notation by Cole et al. [9], we define ρij = pijwj . We assume that the jobs on a machine
are scheduled in increasing order of ρij , which is known as Smith’s rule [23]; if two jobs
on a machine have the same time-to-weight ratio, we use a tie-breaking rule. The cost
Cj of job j which it seeks to minimize is simply its completion time. In the following,
we assume for simplicity that the ρij are pairwise distinct (but the results continue to
hold without this assumption). Then we can write
Cj(x) =
∑
k∈Xi: ρik≤ρij
pik.
The social cost C we consider is the weighted sum of the players’ completion times,
i.e., C =
∑
j wjCj .
In the following, we use the three-field notation by Graham et al [13]. In this no-
tation, the problem we described is denoted by R||
∑
j wjCj . If all weights are 1, we
write
∑
j Cj instead of
∑
j wjCj . Furthermore, if there are speeds si for each machine
i and fixed processing times pj for each job such that pij = pj/si, we write Q instead
of R. Finally, if we have in addition identical speeds si = 1 for all machines i, the
problem is denoted by P .
4 in the sense that there exist s¯ ∈ Σ and an optimal s∗ ∈ Σ such that for all s ∈ Σ it holds that∑
i
Ci(s¯i, s−i) ≤ λC(s) + µC(s
∗), generalizing Roughgarden’s definition of smoothness
[21].
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4.1 R||
∑
j wjCj
Lemma 2 ([9]). For all strategy profiles x and x∗,∑
i∈[m]
∑
j∈X∗
i
wjpij +
∑
i∈[m]
∑
j∈X∗
i
∑
k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρij , ρik} ≤ 2C(x
∗) +
1
2
C(x),
where X∗i is defined similarly to Xi as X∗i = {j ∈ J | x∗j = i}.
Proof. The claim is shown in the proof of [9, Theorem 3.2]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. LetG be an instance ofR||∑j wjCj that satisfies the following condition
for all jobs j, k and all machines i: ρij ≤ ρik implies wj ≤ wk (i.e., if k gets scheduled
after j on i, then it is because of its processing time, not its weight). Then the robust
PoA of all friendship extensions Gα of G is at most 4.
For jobs j and k, αjk has an influence on j’s strategy in an equilibrium only if
there is a machine i such that k gets scheduled after j on i because j cannot influence
k’s costs otherwise. Hence the weight condition tells us that the only jobs that could
potentially have an influence on j are in fact the jobs that are at least equally important
as j. Hence j cannot ‘misplace his affections’ and care too much about unimportant
jobs.
Proof. First we show that G is strongly SC-bounded. Clearly, (1) and (2) are satisfied.
It remains to show that (3) holds. For all jobs j and strategy profiles x,∑
k
(Ck(x) − Ck(∅, x−i)) = Cj(x) +
∑
k: xk=xj , ρxjk>ρxjj
pxjj .
It follows that if i = xj , then
wj
∑
k
(Ck(x) − Ck(∅, x−i)) = wj
(
Cj(x) +
∑
k∈Xi: ρik>ρij
pij
)
≤ wjCj(x) +
∑
k∈Xi : ρik>ρij
wkpij = C¯j(x),
where the inequality follows from the condition on the weights. So G is indeed strongly
SC-bounded.
We calculate
C¯j(x
∗
j , x−j) = wjCj(x
∗
j , x−j) +
∑
k∈Xi: ρik>ρij
wkpij
= wjpij +
∑
k∈Xi : ρik<ρij
wkwjρik +
∑
k∈Xi: ρik>ρij
wkwjρij
≤ wjpij +
∑
k∈Xi
wjwkmin{ρij , ρik}.
Summing over all machines i and j ∈ X∗i , this is the same expression as in Lemma 2.
Hence
∑
j C¯j(x
∗
j , x−j) ≤ 2C(x
∗) + 12C(x) and G¯ is (2, 1/2)-smooth. It follows by
Theorem 4 that the robust PoA in the friendship model is at most 4. ⊓⊔
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This bound is tight: [10] shows that the pure PoA forRP ||∑j Cj is 4.RP ||∑j Cj
is almost defined as P ||
∑
j Cj with the exception that each player i can only use a
subset of the set of machines, i.e. Σi ⊆ [m] (R stands for restricted). Consider an in-
stance of RP ||
∑
j Cj . We can simulate restrictions in the R||
∑
j Cj setting by letting
pij > maxx Cj(x) for machines i that are not allowed for j, where x runs over the fea-
sible schedules of the original instance. Then j neither chooses i in a Nash equilibrium
nor in the optimal schedule. Hence the PoA stays the same in the new game. Thus the
lower bounds in [10] also work for our setting.
The weight condition is necessary. In fact, if we drop it, the pure PoA is unbounded
even for P ||
∑
j wjCj instances with unit-size jobs. An illustrating example is given in
Appendix B.
4.2 P ||
∑
j Cj
Fix an ordering of the jobs such that pj > pj′ implies j > j′. We use the same notation
as in [17]: For a schedule x, a job j and a machine i, let hxi (j) = |{j′ > j | xj′ = xj}|.
This is the number of jobs that are scheduled after j on i. Using this notation, we can
write C¯j(x) = Cj(x) + hxxj (j) · pj for instances with unit speeds.
Throughout this section, let x¯ denote the randomized schedule that assigns each job
to each machine with probability 1
m
.
Lemma 3. Let x be an arbitrary schedule. Then
∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)] =
1
m
∑
j
pj(m+ n− j).
Note that, surprisingly, this is independent of x.
Proof. Clearly,∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)] =
∑
j
(
pj +
∑
k<j
pk · P (x¯j = xk)
)
=
∑
j
(
pj +
∑
k<j
pk
m
)
.
Reordering the second sum gives us
∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)] =
∑
j
pj +
∑
j
∑
k>j
pj
m
=
1
m
∑
j
pj (m+ n− j) . ⊓⊔
The following theorem will be helpful to establish an upper bound on the robust
PoA for the friendship model and might be of independent interest. We defer its proof
to Appendix C.
Theorem 6. For any schedule x and any optimal x∗,
∑
j
Cj(x¯j , x−j) ≤ C(x
∗) +
(1
2
−
1
2m
)∑
j
pj .
In particular, the robust price of anarchy of P ||∑j Cj is at most 32 − 12m . This bound
is tight.
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Theorem 7. LetG be an instance ofP ||∑j Cj . Then the robust PoA for any friendship
extension Gα is at most 2.
Proof. Let x be arbitrary. Then by linearity of expectation,
E
[∑
j
C¯j(x¯j , x−j)
]
=
∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)] +
∑
j
E[hxx¯j(j)] · pj.
We know that
E[hxx¯j(j)] =
1
m
∑
i
hxi (j) =
1
m
|{j′ ∈ J | j′ > j}| = E[hx¯xj(j)].
Hence the second term evaluates as∑
j
E[hxx¯j (j)] · pj =
∑
j
E[hx¯xj(j)] · pj =
∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , xj)]−
∑
j
pj .
We know by Theorem 6 that
∑
j E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)] ≤ C(x
∗) + (12 −
1
2m )
∑
j pj . Hence∑
j
E[C¯j(x¯j , x−j)] = 2
∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)]−
∑
j
pj
≤ 2C(x∗)−
1
m
∑
j
pj ≤ 2C(x
∗),
for any schedule x∗. Hence the robust PoA for the friendship extension is at most 2. ⊓⊔
5 Linear Congestion Games
An atomic congestion game G = (N,E, {Σi}i∈N , (de)e∈E) is given by a set E of
resources together with delay functions de : N → R+ indicating the delay on e for a
given number of players using e. Each player’s strategy set consists of subsets of E;
Σi ⊆ P(E) for all i. For s ∈ Σ, let xe(s) = |{i ∈ N | e ∈ si}|. The cost of each player
i under s is given by Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
de(xe(s)). If all delay functions are linear, we say
that G is linear. The social cost C is simply the sum over all individual cost. By ∅i = ∅
we mean the strategy where player i uses no machine.
It is known that we can without loss of generality assume that all latency functions
are of the form le(x) = x. This was first mentioned in [8]. For a proof, see [7]. The
following lemma is shown in the proof of [8, Theorem 1].
Lemma 4 ([8]). Let G be a linear congestion game and s, s∗ ∈ Σ. Then∑
i
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤
∑
e
xe(s
∗)(xe(s) + 1).
Lemma 5 ([1]). For any pair α, β ∈ N, it holds that 25α3 + 175 β2 ≥ β(α + 1).
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Bilo` et al. show in their paper [1] that the pure PoA lies between 5 and 17/3 for a
restricted friendship setting, where αij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j. We generalize their result
to the robust PoA for arbitrary αij ∈ [0, 1] and show tightness.
Theorem 8. Let G be a linear congestion game. Then the robust PoA of all friendship
extensions Gα is bounded by 173 ≈ 5.67. This bound is tight.
Proof. We have
C¯i(s) = Ci(s) +
∑
e∈si
|{j 6= i | e ∈ sj}| = Ci(s) +
∑
e∈si
xe(∅, s−i) ≥ Ci(s),
so G is SC-bounded. Also G is strongly SC-bounded: If i does not use any machine, he
experiences no waiting time; the other’s completion times can only increase if another
player enters; and finally, C =
∑
j Cj .
Let s, s∗ ∈ Σ. We abbreviate xe(s) and xe(s∗) by xe and x∗e , respectively. The
calculation of the robust PoA for G¯ yields∑
i
C¯i(s
∗
i , s−i) =
∑
i
C(s∗i , s−i) +
∑
i
∑
e∈s∗
i
xe(∅, s−i).
The first term is at most
∑
e x
∗
e(xe+1) by Lemma 4. The second term is bounded from
above by
∑
i
∑
e∈s∗
i
xe(s) =
∑
e∈E xex
∗
e . Hence we get in total by Lemma 5
∑
e
x∗e(2xe + 1) ≤
∑
e
(
17
5
(x∗e)
2 +
2
5
x2e
)
=
17
5
C(s∗) +
2
5
C(s).
It follows that the robust PoA of G¯ is at most 175 /(1−
2
5 ) =
17
3 .
We show now that the bound of 173 is asymptotically tight. Let n ≥ 0. Consider an
instance with n + 3 blocks of players B0, . . . , Bn+2 consisting of three players each:
Bk = {ak, bk, ck}. We construct a Nash equilibrium s and an optimal strategy profile s∗
as follows. For all resources e, we set le(x) = x. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n, the pattern of strategies
repeats (see Figure 1). Here player i = ak has two strategies si = {3k, 3k+1, 3k+2}
and s∗i = {3k + 6}. Player i = bk has two strategies si = {3k + 2, 3k + 3} and
s∗i = {3k+7}. Player i = ck has two strategies si = {3k+3, 3k+4} and s∗i = {3k+8}.
The strategies si of players in the final blocksBn+1 and Bn+2 are defined as above.
However, we need to change the definition of s∗i because otherwise, s is not a Nash
equilibrium. So for each i ∈ Bn+1 ∪ Bn+2, we insert sets of new, previously unused
resources s∗i such that Ci(si) = |s∗i |.
For the following tuples of players (i, j) it holds that αij = 1:
(ak, bk+1), (ak, ck+1), (ak, ak+2) as well as (bk, ck+1), (bk, ak+2) and
(ck, ak+2), (ck, bk+2), where 0 ≤ k ≤ n. All other αij are zero. Hence αij = 1 iff s∗i
intersects sj . Note that if si ∩ sj 6= ∅, then αij = 0.
Now, we claim that s is a Nash equilibrium. In fact, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n and i = ak,
Cα(s) = C(s) +
∑
j 6=i αijCj(s) = 7 + 5 + 5 + 7 = 24, which equals Cαi (s∗, s−i) =
4+ 6+6+8. A similar calculation shows Ci(s) = Ci(si, s−i) for i = bk, ck. Observe
that for k = n + 1, n + 2, and i ∈ Bk, Cαi (s) = C(s) = |s∗i | = C(s∗i , s−i) by our
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Bk−1
Bk
Bk+1
Bk+2
ak
bk
ck
Fig. 1. The strategy profiles s (grey) and s∗ (white). Columns correspond to resources.
construction of s∗i . Hence s is indeed a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that s∗ is
optimal.
For k = 1, . . . , n, block Bk has the same cost: C(Bk) :=
∑
i∈Bk
Ci(s) = 17 and
C∗(Bk) :=
∑
i∈Bk
Ci(s
∗) = 3. Let X = C(B0) + C(Bn+1) + C(Bn+2) and X∗ =
C∗(B0)+C
∗(Bn+1)+C
∗(Bn+2) and observe that these are constants independent of
n. It follows that
C(s)
C(s∗)
=
17n+X
3n+X∗
=
17 + o(n)
3 + o(n)
. ⊓⊔
6 Auctions
An auction G consists of an allocation rule a : Σ → N which determines which bidder
gets the item and a pricing rule p : Σ → RN indicating how much each player should
pay. Each bidder i is assumed to have a certain valuation vi ∈ R+ for the item. For a
given bidding profile b ∈ RN+ , the social welfare is Π(b) = va(b). Player i’s utility is
given by Πi(b) = vi − pi(b) if he gets the object and −pi(b) otherwise. In a second-
price auction, the highest bidder gets the item and pays the second highest bid, while
everybody else pays nothing.
We do not allow overbidding, i.e., for all bidders i, bi ≤ vi. This is a standard
assumption because overbidding is a dominated strategy. We denote by β(b, i) the name
of the player who places the i-th highest bid in b. We write β(i) instead of β(b, i) if the
bidding profile is clear from the context. ∅i = 0 denotes the strategy where bidder i
bids nothing.
Theorem 9. Consider an auction G with an allocation rule as in the second-price auc-
tion and a pricing rule p where every bidder pays at most what he would pay in a
second-price auction (for every given bidding profile). Then the robust PoA of all altru-
ism extensions Gα is at most 2.
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Proof. Let G be an auction of the described type. We show that G is SC-bounded. Let
b be a bidding profile. We calculate
Π¯i(b) = Π(b)−Π(0, b−i) =
{
vβ(1) − vβ(2), i = β(1)
0, otherwise.
Note that Πβ(1) ≥ vβ(1) − bβ(2) ≥ vβ(1)− vβ(2) because we do not allow overbidding.
Hence Πi(b) ≥ Π¯i(b) for all i. So G is SC-bounded.
Now, let b∗ be the optimal bidding profile where the bidder with the highest valua-
tion, say bidder 1, bids his valuation and everybody else bids nothing. Let b be arbitrary.
Then
∑
i Π¯i(b
∗, b−i) =
∑
i(Π(b
∗
i , b−i) − Π(0, b−i)) = Π(v1, b−1) − Π(0, b−1).
Now, we distinguish two cases: Either bidder 1 wins under b and then b is opti-
mal and Π(0, b−1) ≤ Π(b). Otherwise, the winner remains the same if 1 does not
bid anything, so Π(0, b−1) = Π(b). In any case, Π(0, b−1) ≤ Π(b). Furthermore,
Π(v1, b−1) = v1 = Π(b
∗) because no bidder can overbid v1. It follows that the term
above is bounded from below by Π(b∗)−Π(b). Thus the robust PoA is at most 2. ⊓⊔
Theorem 10. Let G be a second-price auction. Then the coarse PoA of the class of
friendship extensions of G is exactly 2.
Note that here the friendship model is not a generalization of the altruism model
because Π 6=
∑
iΠi. We defer the proof to Appendix D.
7 Valid Utility Games
A valid utility game [26] is defined as a payoff-maximization game G =
(N,E, {Σi}i∈N , {Π}i∈N , V ), where E is a ground set of resources, Σi ⊆ P(E) and
V is a submodular and non-negative function on E. The social welfare Π is given by
Π(s) = V (
⋃
i∈N si) and is assumed to be sum-bounded. Furthermore, we require G
to satisfy Πi(s) ≥ Π(s) −Π(∅, s−i) for all s ∈ Σ. If G additionally satisfies the last
inequation with equality, it is called basic utility game [26]. For all players i, set ∅i = ∅.
Theorem 11 ([21]). The robust PoA of valid utility games with non-decreasing5 set
function V is bounded by 2.
An example for valid utility games with non-decreasing set functions are competi-
tive facility location games without fixed costs [26].
The following theorem has already been proven in [7] and tightness of this bound
has been shown in [2] for the base game. We now use our framework to provide a
shorter proof that illustrates nicely why the robust PoA does not increase for altruistic
extensions: The corresponding SCG falls into the same category of games.
Theorem 12. Let G be a valid utility game with non-decreasing V . Then the robust
price of anarchy of every altruistic extension Gα of G is bounded by 2.
Proof. It follows directly from the definition that G is SC-bounded. It is easy to verify
that the corresponding SCG G¯ = (N,E, {Σi}i∈N , {Π¯}i∈N , V ) is again a valid utility
game:
∑
i Π¯i(s) ≤
∑
iΠi(s) ≤ Π(s) and Π¯i(s) = Π(s) −Π(∅, s−i). So the robust
PoA of G¯ is at most 2. Our claim follows by Theorem 3. ⊓⊔
5 where non-decreasing means that for all A ⊆ B ⊆ E it holds that V (A) ≤ V (B).
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. LetGα be a friendship extension of a cost-minimization game with weight-
bounded social cost functionC. If Gα is (λ, µ)-smooth with µ < 1, then the coarse PoA
of Gα is at most λ1−µ .
Proof. The proof works similarly to [19, Theorem 1]:
Let σ be a coarse equilibrium forGα and let s be a random variable with distribution
σ. In addition, let s∗ be an arbitrary strategy profile and let s¯ be as in the definition of
smoothness. We assume without loss of generality that s¯ is a pure strategy profile; the
arguments also work in the mixed case. Because σ is a coarse equilibrium, for all players
i we have
E
[
Ci(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αijCj(s)
]
≤ E
[
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
αijCj(s¯i, s−i)
]
Using linearity of expectation, it follows that
E[C(s)] ≤
∑
i
wiE[Ci(s)]
≤
∑
i
wiE
[
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(s))
]
= E
[∑
i
wi
(
Ci(s¯i, s−i) +
∑
j 6=i
αij(Cj(s¯i, s−i)− Cj(s))
)]
≤ E[λC(s∗) + µC(s)]
= λC(s∗) + µE[C(s)]
Hence E[C(s)] ≤ λ1−µC(s
∗). ⊓⊔
B Necessity of Weight Condition
Let us assume we have m machines and m jobs of weight 1 as well as m(m − 1)
jobs of weight 0. Let Ai (i = 1, 2) denote the set of jobs of weight i. Set αjk = 1 if
j ∈ A1, k ∈ A0, 0 otherwise.
First, consider the schedule x where every job in A1 gets scheduled on machine 1
and all the jobs from A0 are distributed among the remaining m − 1 machines such
that every machine i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} gets exactly m jobs. We can assume that the tie-
breaking rule among jobs in A0 is such that they cannot improve their completion time
by deviating. Then x is a Nash equilibrium: Indeed, let j ∈ A1. Then Cj(x) ≤ m and
for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, Cj(i, x−j) = 1 +
∑
k∈A0: xk=i
1 = 1 + m. Hence j has no
incentive to deviate. Note that C(x) =
∑m
j=1 j =
1
2m(m+ 1).
Now, in an optimal schedule x∗, the jobs are distributed among the machines in
such a way that every machine completes exactly one job of weight 1. Hence an optimal
schedule satisfies C(x∗) = m.
It follows that the pure PoA is at least 12 (m+ 1) and thus unbounded.
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C Robust PoA of P ||
∑
j Cj
In order to characterize the optimal solution, we use the Minimum Mean Flow Time
(MFT) algorithm [18] that produces an optimal schedule for Q||∑j Cj . A formal de-
scription of the algorithm is given below [17].
Algorithm 1 The MFT Algorithm
For each machine i set hi = 0
while not all jobs are placed do
Take the longest job j of the set of unscheduled jobs
Assign j to the machine i with the smallest value of (hi + 1)/si
For the chosen machine update hi := hi + 1
end while
Sort the jobs on each machine in SPT order
Lemma 6. Let x∗ be an optimal schedule for P ||∑j Cj . Then C(x∗) = ∑j pj(1 +
⌊(n− j)/m⌋).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x∗ is generated by the MFT al-
gorithm. Consider some job j and let i = x∗j . For each job j′ that is considered after j
(i.e., each job with smaller index), the algorithm chooses a machine i′ that minimizes
hx
∗
i′ (j
′). So it chooses exactly m − 1 other machines before it places another job on i
(provided that the algorithm always uses the same tie-breaking rule on the set of ma-
chines). Hence j causes a delay of pj for himself and for ⌊(n− j)/m⌋ other machines.
Summing over all jobs j, the formula follows. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let p1 ≤ . . . ≤ pm be a sequence of reals. Then(
1
2
−
1
2m
) m∑
j=1
pj ≥
m∑
j=1
m− j
m
pj .
Proof. Let δj = pj − pj−1 ≥ 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where p0 is set to 0. It holds that
m
∑
j
∑
k≤j
δj =
∑
j
(m− j + 1)mδj
≥
∑
j
(m− j + 1)(1 + (m− j))δj
=
∑
j
(m− j + 1)δj +
∑
j
(m− j)(m− j + 1)δj
=
∑
j
∑
k≤j
δk +
∑
j
(m− j)(m− j + 1)δj (1)
The second sum equals
2
∑
k
(m− k)(m− k + 1)
2
δk = 2
∑
k

δk m−k∑
j=1
j


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= 2
∑
j
(m− j)
∑
k≤j
δk (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we get
m
∑
j
pj = m
∑
j
∑
k≤j
δj
≥
∑
j
∑
k≤j
δk + 2
∑
j
(m− j)
∑
k≤j
δk
=
∑
j
pj + 2
∑
j
(m− j)pj .
Thus (m− 1)
∑
j pj ≥ 2
∑
j(m− j)pj . Multiplying by
1
2m
, the claim follows. ⊓⊔
Recall that by x¯ we denote the mixed schedule that assigns each job to each
machine with equal probability.
Theorem 6. For any schedule x and any optimal x∗,
∑
j
Cj(x¯j , x−j) ≤ C(x
∗) +
(1
2
−
1
2m
)∑
j
pj .
In particular, the robust price of anarchy of P ||∑j Cj is at most 32 − 12m . This bound
is tight.
Proof. First we bound the robust PoA from above.
Let x be an arbitrary schedule and suppose x∗ is optimal. Then by Lemma 3,
∑
j
E[Cj(x¯j , x−j)] =
∑
j
pj
(
1 +
n− j
m
)
=
∑
j
pj
(
1 +
⌊
n− j
m
⌋)
+
∑
j
pj
(
(n− j) mod m
m
)
The left sum evaluates as C(x∗) by Lemma 6. It follows from Lemma 7 that the right
sum is at most
(
1
2 −
1
2m
)∑
j pj , which in turn is at most
(
1
2 −
1
2m
)
C(x∗). This shows
the claim.
Now we give a lower bound on the robust PoA. Take m = n and let all jobs have
the same processing time, say 1. Again, let x¯ be the mixed schedule that assigns each
job to each machine with probability 1
m
. The optimal schedule x∗ assigns exactly one
job to each machine and thus has a cost of m. By Lemma 3, the cost of x¯ evaluates as
C(x¯) =
∑
j
(
1 +
n− j
m
)
= m+
1
m
∑
j
(m− j) = m+
m(m− 1)
2m
=
3
2
m−
1
2
.
Hence the mixed price of anarchy (which is a lower bound for the robust PoA) is at
least 32 −
1
2m . ⊓⊔
19
D Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 10. Let G be a second-price auction. Then the coarse PoA of the class of
friendship extensions of G is exactly 2.
Proof. Unfortunately,G is not strongly SC-bounded because assumption (3) is not sat-
isfied. However, we can still bound the coarse PoA for Gα by using G¯ in the following
way.
Consider a Nash equilibrium b and a valuation profile v such that, say, bidder 1
has the highest value for the item. Let b∗ be as in the last proof, i.e., bidder 1 bids his
value and everybody else bids nothing. If β(b, 1) = 1, then Π(b) = Π1(b∗1, b−1) ≥
Π¯1(b
∗
1, b−1) =
∑
i Π¯i(b
∗
i , b−i), so we can use the robust PoA of G¯. Now, assume
β(b, 1) 6= 1. Then
0 = Π1(b) ≥ Π1(b
∗
1, b−1) +
∑
j 6=1
α1j(Πj(b
∗
1, b−1)−Πj(b))
= Π(b∗1, b−1)− bβ(b,1) − α1β(b,1)Πβ(b,1)(b).
We know that bβ(b,1) ≤ vβ(b,1) = Π(b) = Π(0, b−1). Also, α1β(b,1)Πβ(b,1)(b) ≤
Π(b). Hence
0 ≥ Π(b∗1, b−1)− (0, b−1)−Π(b).
Hence again Π(b) is at least Π¯(b∗1, b−1) =
∑
i Π¯i(b
∗
i , b−i). A canonical calculation
shows that the same holds for coarse equilibria. Now, in the previous proof we saw that
G¯ is (1,−1)-smooth with respect to b∗. So the coarse PoA of G is at most 2.
It remains to show that this bound is tight. Consider the following situation: We
have two bidders with v1 = 1, v2 = 2, α12 = α21 = 1. Clearly, it is optimal to allocate
the item to bidder 2 with a social welfare of 2. However, the bidding profile b = (1, 0)
is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, bidder 2 has a utility of Πα(b) = 1 which remains the
same if he outbids player 1. ⊓⊔
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